60's / 90's
Dissolving the People

HONG KONG SIXTIES

Matthew Turner

When the foundation stone for a new Hong Kong City Hall was laid in 1960, there were a few optimists who saw in the design a "symbolic focus...to draw together the people of Hong Kong into an integrated community," and by extension, a design for:

> a Hong Kong citizenship based on a loyalty to the local community and characterized by a fusion of European and Chinese traditions.[1]

This sort of sentimental colonialism may have appealed to a small élite of patrician families, society notables and university-educated civil servants, but to the majority of Hong Kong's refugee-swollen population, City Hall was as irrelevant as the British themselves.[2] Looking back a decade after the building's opening, one colonial historian complained that early hopes for citizenship had been dashed, since "the population of Hong Kong has remained thoroughly Chinese in outlook, divided into a number of clans or communities."[3]

Yet the design of City Hall, the first high-rise, international style architecture on Hong Kong Harbour, symbolized the displacement of old-style Colonialism as well as Chinese tradition. Against the monumental, colonnaded architecture of Central District's clubs, courts and banks, it was an startlingly light and open building, from its extensive public areas to exposed glass stairwell. The association of the cultural with the political and the civic was also unusual. For in combining the swearing-in of Governors with the popular election of beauty queens, judicial ceremonies with Cantonese opera, movies with marriages, the gloss of culture was for the first time presented as legitimization for colonial rule over the vastly increased, and largely dispossessed population of Hong Kong.[4]

A radical break from the past was appropriate, for the sixties was to be a brutal weaning of Hong Kong from China as well as from Britain, and after 1967, an abrupt coming of age for a new society.

> The Government has lost the confidence of the people, so the Government has decided to dissolve the people and appoint a new one.
>
> *Brecht*

十八　本港的服裝

'Local dress', from textbook
教科書中的「本地服裝」



Changing images of 'Society' in Hong Kong textbooks. Society (Yin Dai press, 1960) (below), and Society (Yan Yan press, 1969) (above). At the beginning of the decade, the monuments of colonialism and symbols of western modernity are dwarfed by (Chinese) nature; by the end of the decade, an enveloping modernity erases Colonial as well as Chinese history, here reduced to a museum artefact.
教科書中「社會」形象的改變。(下圖)〈社會〉，現代出版社，1960。(上圖)〈社會〉，人人出版社，1969。六十年代初，象徵殖民主義及西方現代主義的建築物在與「中國」風景相比下顯得非常細小；但到六十年代末，現代主義已蓋掩了整個殖民地及中國歷史，書面中只剩下博物館的造型。

Underlying these social changes was Hong Kong's pivotal economic shift away from regional exports to manufacture for Western markets, a commercial and ideological transformation engineered by the Government-inspired Federation of Hong Kong Industries, also founded in 1960.[5] As the local economy achieved independence and the administration assumed effective autonomy, local life-styles also began to diverge sharply from that of Taiwan or the Communist Mainland, and the population found itself, for the first time, alienated from China. Politically exhausted after the violent confrontations with colonial rule in 1966 and 1967, Hong Kong turned instead to the material benefits of slowly rising standards of living, while the first locally-born generation aspired to western styles, images of which were widely diffused by the new mass-media.

It was not until 1967 that the rhetoric of 'citizenship,' of 'community' and 'belonging' was first deployed on a grand scale as anti-Communist counter-propaganda.[6] As a palliative to the summer of riots, bombs, and murders, a 'Hong Kong Week' had been hastily worked up to include popular entertainments, exhibitions, fashion shows, and a floats parade. The event, organized by the Federation of Hong Kong Industries, was to provide the blueprint the much larger 'Festival of Hong Kong' in 1969, a week long carnival of dancing, parades, fashion shows and pop concerts organized by the Government to demonstrate that the "community was as one," and "a shop window for democracy."[7]

Quixotic as this rhetoric was, by the end of the sixties the idea of 'community' was no longer an irrelevance to the majority of the population. For alongside the official discourse, a local, and largely unarticulated sense of identity had begun to emerge in Hong Kong. It was a raw identity born of the common experience of dislocation, physically manifest in the high-rise transformation of the city during the building boom of 1962-66, and the relocation of some 50% of all households into high-density public housing.[8] It was also marked by a subjective change in Hong Kong peoples' attitude towards their 'own' city, in part, a consequence of an increasing focus on local issues (the 1966 'Star Ferry riot' was of a purely domestic concern domestic[9]), and in part the growing independence of the local administration, reflected in a vastly increased local employment in the civil service. But it was also a change articulated in the incidentals of daily life, in *feigi chaan* lunches, in the slang of *Siu Lau Man* comic books, in Chan Po Chu's movies of factory life or gossip about local film idols.

The social changes that brought about new perceptions of identity were to some extent officially promoted, such as Cantonese-medium broadcasting and primary school education, the District Offices, or the precursors of the 'Keep Hong Kong Clean' campaign. But for the most part these changes were not imposed but chosen as, for example, the integration of rival Chinese dialect groups in business, or the undergrowth of local education. Or they were social transformations wrought by economic development, such as the pressures on families brought about by separation from ancestral authority, high-density housing, and the new economic freedom brought home by factory girls.

Perhaps the most remarkable demonstration of local identity during this period was the annual Chinese Manufacturers' Exhibition of Hong Kong Products, held each year since 1934. By the sixties, the Exhibition had grown in scale and variety to become the Colony's largest festival outside Chinese New Year.

Ostensibly a trade promotion, it is doubtful whelther the Exhibitions were useful in securing export orders. Rather, the event was designed to bring together the whole community in several weeks of entertainments, just before Christmas. People came to admire the miraculous parvilions erected by each company, ranging from the Chinoiserie to the Modernistic, to participate in dancing, to watch fashion shows and opera, beauty pageants and competitions. But most of all people came to buy, consuming thousands of locally manufactured goods set out in elaborate, overflowing displays.

As export items, most of these utilitarian items, from thermos, flashs to underwear, plastic buckets to toys, could not be purchased elsewhere. Yet the real attraction to Hong Kong 's working population lay in admiring and buying the very products they themselves had made in the factories. Surrounded by all the hoop la of the Exhibition the exports on which the economy depended were transformed into icons (often literally) of local identity, an identity of collective consumption.

In this way the CMA Exhibitions set a pattern for Hong Kong's future identity as a consumer culture, an identity suspended between the fantasy of export

Hong Kong experienced the birth of an Asian consumer culture before the children in these photographs could have possessed locally-made toys. Factory sales and over-runs of export children in a fashion quite unlike their parents. (Source: Pictorial Record of the Chinese Manufacturers' Association 19th Exhibition, 1961; Hong Kong Life, 1966)
香港經歷了亞洲消費文化的誕生，以致相片中的兒童也手持本地出產的玩具。工廠出售出口兒童服裝，使兒童的衣著與父母的款色截然不同(資料來源：〈第十九屆中華廠商會圖片集〉，1961，〈香港生活〉，1966。

Aerial view of 27th Chinese Manufacturers' Association annual exhibition, 1969, on the site of the future Tsimshatsui East. (Source: CMA Pictorial Record)
一九六九年第二十七屆中華廠商會的周年展覽的全景，即現今尖沙咀東部，（資料來源：《中華廠商會圖片集》）。

promotion and the grim experience of factory life, neither colonial nor nationalistic, yet predommantly Cantonese.

Official representations and popular perceptions of Hong Kong were by this point difficult to separate. External presentations of the city as economically independent, in trade shows, tourist promotions and western-style export clothing or products, were now absorbed into the self-perception and daily lives of Hong Kong people.

For example, while Government agencies portrayed images of smart, efficient, diligent female secretaries to promote exports or attract overseas investment, local factory workers dreamed of office jobs, and more privileged young women adopted sharp modern fashions -with a crispness of design enough to avoid any suggestion of the bar girl. Fashion shows, originally introduced in 1967 to promote exports, were instantly adapted as social events, while ready-to-wear fashion displaced reliance on tailoring and dressmaking, and with the decline of the sewing machine, Chinese styles of *saam fu* and *cheong saam* that until the 1960's had signified Chinese identity.[10]

Even the empty promises of democracy had become a foil for intellectual debate on society. Local identity and democracy were issues that drove the student movements and 'pressure-group' reforms of the late sixties and early seventies, and would become popular concerns of the eighties.[11]

By the end of the sixties it seemed as if the promise of modernization, symbolized in the design of City Hall, had been fulfilled. On the eve of the seventies, Hong Kong had become the world's 20th largest trading economy, and its society was far more independent, interdependent, mobile and outward-looking, the city more dynamic and westernized in appearance, than the architects of citizenship could have imagined ten years' earlier. The people of Hong Kong had come to recognize themselves reflected in vernacular pop songs, newspapers and comics, new expressions of identity in English-medium school textbooks, and in the images purveyed by advertising, popular photography and television.



(Above) Lydia Dunn (for Swire & Maclean) design for a 'modern oriental image' (Source: Hong Kong Trade Bulletin, 1966), and (below) the westernisation of local fashion. (Source: Hong Kong Fashion, 1969)
（上圖）鄧蓮如（太古及 Maclean 集團）設計的摩登東方形像（資料來源：香港貿易特刊，1966）。（下圖）西化的香港時裝（資料來源：香港時裝，1969）。

Did the sixties then mark the emergence of Hong Kong's modern identity? It is true that very few would even have used such an expression existed in the fifties, yet by the seventies it had become a focus of official, popular and intellectual concern.[12] It is difficult to provide evidence for the sixties, for those who did ask the question 'Who are We?' were often unable to articulate an identity. Writing in 1965, for example, one newspaper column headed "Is a Hong Kong Identity too Utopian?" came to the conclusion that the majority were unable to 'talk' about identity:

> This is not a new idea. Hongkongites have been talking about it for years...The root of the problem in wanting to instill this Hongkong identity sense into the citizenry is to determine who belongs and wants to belong to Hongkong...(But) for the idea of a Hongkong identity to grow and for its people to take pride in being identified with Hongkong, living standards have to go up. Otherwise its like trying to give culture to hungry and needy people -it simply just won't work.[13]

It is often averred that the Chinese language has no word for 'identity,' but only for race,[14] with the corollary that there could no linguistic construction of Hong Kong identity -perhaps even that if there are no words for something, it cannot be said to exist. Such a narrow view of life would privilege language over indeterminate, subjective experience, and be unable to explain the ways in which individual and social identities are produced by the 'force-fit' of language on a subject.[15]

Certainly the Hong Kong identity during the sixties was not constituted in a stable narrative, but rather emerged from a clash of discourses -citizen and compatriot, Chinese and Western, morality and utilitarianism- and like the dummy in the 'shop-window of democracy,' it was a product of the clash between official rhetoric from lived experience, of the local from the international, of factory life from trade promotion of exports, of prostitution and *The World of Suzy Wong*, of tourist posters and public housing. As Benedict Anderson suggests in *Imagined Communities* a "separation of language from reality" (as happened in Hong Kong when the temporality of international trade and fashion trends overlaid local concerns) produces "a form of homogenous empty time, the time of cultural modernity."[16] It was precisely the inability to articulate identity during the sixties along any stable narrative that marked out Hong Kong people from Chinese on the Mainland or Taiwan.

Even today, in everyday language as well as in local films and advertising, the Hong Kong life-style is commonly presented in terms of compressed time: 'pressure of time,' 'time is money,' 'borrowed time,' 'time is running out,' and so on. The clock is used throughout Wong Kar Wai's film *Ah Fei Jing Jun*, set in 1960, to distinguish Hong Kong from the Philippines. Local advertising exhibits a unique, if not pathological preoccupation with watches as status objects. As with the dissolution of Chinese identity through Ready-to-Wear fashion, here again Hong Kong's role as a major producer and exporter of clocks and watches, and more generally, an export economy constituted on catching the latest trends in western markets,[17] interacts with a local experience of temporal compression. Refugees moving from rural, patriarchal China, moved from a time of settled locality and kinship to one of discontinuity and competition in capitalist Hong Kong, a time in which future trends become present concerns.[18] So it was that despite the powerful pull of ethnicity, the population of Hong Kong rejected an identification with Mainland China after 1967. In doing so, the discourse of race (whether an attachment to *Guomin* 'country-race' or regional ethnicity) was displaced by a more flexible, ambiguous, more generously inclusive, local and popular *cultural* identity, a culture of diaspora, in which multiple norms, values and forms of behaviour -communal,

Plain Talk

Is a HK identity too utopian to think about?

Hongkong has been called a railway station. People come and go through it, have a flirtation or romance with it, but never a love affair.

They work here, make money here, raise families here, but still do not accept Hongkong as their home. The actor James Mason, when he visited Hongkong last year, in the course of a tete-a-tete I had with him, asked: "who makes Hongkong his home?" He had a point.

He implied from his pertinent remarks that people who consider Hongkong their home should be the ones to have a greater say in both governmental and civic affairs.

It is something which Government should encourage on a large scale by spending, for instance, more money on primary and higher education and making more university scholarships available to those who may have the ability but not the means to have a university education.

But who are the Hongkong people?

They are the ones who stick it out here through thick and thin.

Without wanting to get into a semantic argument over the word society or to quote Ortega y Gasset's full description of it, that it is one person and many, but with each doing something for the other, the Hongkong society means essentially those people to whom Hongkong means more than just a port of call or a rendezvous with some Suzie Wong.

This is not to take a narrow viewpoint of travellers who are welcome — they are contributing to the growth of tourism. They belong to another welcome category of people.

For the idea of a Hongkong identity to grow and for its people to take pride in being identified with Hongkong, living standards have to go up. Otherwise it is like trying to give culture to hungry and needy people — it simply just won't work. An idea, viewed in this sense, is more utopian than realistic: it is bound to fail before it even begins to take root.

by Ernie Pereira

Hong Kong Standard 28/2/65

A Hong Kong Identity in 1965? Ernie Pereira, Hong Kong Tiger Standards, 28.2.1965.
一九六五年的香港身份？Emie Pereira，香港虎報，28.2.65。

Western, national, familial, capitalistic, Christian, paternalistic, democratic- could be syncretically overlaid or hybidized.[19]

It is in this context that the prevalence of local snapshot photography during the sixties may be interpreted as a vehicle for trying out new or multiple identities of what Hong Kong people should look like. Childrens' comics show a remarkable number of stories and covers featuring children photographing each other, while camera advertisements focussed on snapshots of children -the first locally born Hong Kong generation. In the same way children learned to match their posture, dress and behavious to images projected by school textbooks and advertising.

There seems to be another connection here with the ethos of Hong Kong industry, constituted on the imitation of foreign products, and characterized by boom industries such as fake wigs, artificial flowers, imitation jewellery, and even waxworks. For Hong Kong's export products had no identity other than an imitation and re-combination of other designs.

A waxwork model of Hong Kong design and Hong Kong identity: (right) H Kong Waxwork Co., Mona Lisa in a Wheelchair, (Source: GIS 5686/3) and simulated products such as wigs, dolls and artificial flowers were some of H Kong's most successful products during the sixties.
香港設計及象徵香港身份的蠟像模型。(右圖)香港蠟像公司，蒙羅麗莎在人力車上料來源：新聞處 5686/3)。(左圖) 仿製品如假髮、公仔、人造花等是六十年代香著名的產品。

It should come as no surprise that the waxworks of the Los Angeles 'Palace of the Living Arts,' famously described in Umberto Eco's comic nightmare, *Travels in Hyper-Reality*, [20] were designed in Hong Kong, the work of Jack Chen, a Shanghainese trained sculptor who joined Hong Kong Chemical Industries in the mid-1950's. The company had built a reputation for designing ornamental wax candles imitating jade figurines (up to 200 designs a year), and around 1960 had progressed to polyester duplications of their earlier wax imitations.[21] When in 1962 a Chinese entrepreneur in Long Beach enquired in Hong Kong about waxwork manufacture, it was natural that the company should have secured the contract to produce four figures, including Nancy Kwan in a rickshaw from the film *The World of Suzy Wong*. Hundreds more figures followed, and it was a short step to La Giaconda in a rickshaw.[22]

A Hong Kong Mona Lisa evokes much the same reaction as Hong Kong wax candles in the form of a jade figurines, Hong Kong polyester jade or Hong Kong imitation jewellery. Yet Hong Kong industry thrived on a 'waxwork model' of design and manufacture. Even the design and manufacturing process of Hong Kong toys, novelties, plastic flowers or wigs, some of the

Colony's most successful industries during the early 1960's, share a remarkable affinity to waxworks.

It is also in the context of negotiating multiple identities that the theme of 'East Meets West' in Hong Kong high culture of the sixties can be better understood. For example, towards the end of the sixties an exhibition boldly entitled 'The Modern Chinese Renaissance',[23] presented local artists as the legitimate heirs to the modern movements of the Nationalist era. In particular, the Lingnan School was singled out as abridge between Chinese and foreign art. In the inter-war era artists such as Gao Jianfu had absorbed elements from Western painting through study in Japan. As Communism cauterized this movement (so the argument ran) the Lingnam tradition moved further South to Hong Kong where, through painters such as Liu Shao-kwan, direct contact could be made with Western abstraction. The result was a 'modern renaissance' painter such as Hon Chi-fun, who communicated Chinese sensibilities without the encumbrance of mountains, clouds and pine-trees, in paintings of bare geometry.

Freelance myth-making of this kind, narrating the mutual benefits of East-West cultural exchange, was a necessity in a society with shaky legitimacy and hybrid culture, and finds echoes in public school textbooks: "Hong Kong was established by Britain and China as a good place to do business."

Without a public myth of origins, however, with no founding fathers or constitution,[24] yet subject to competing foreign influences, language and values from the West, Hong Kong in the late sixties became (in Homi Bhabha's useful phrase) a culture of *translation* rather than tradition.[25] In this hybrid between over-determined, paternalistic rhetoric and the indeterminancy of popular experience, the population of Hong Kong came to identify themselves as '*Heung Gong Yan*,' an ambiguous construction that was more than a 'resident', less than a 'people.'[26]



(Top) Hon Chi Fun, *Raindrop Focus*, silkscreen, 1969, from *Art Now Hong Kong*, Urban Council. Geometric, abstract art was plainly Western, yet during the late Sixties many Hong Kong artists firmly believed that the spirit of Chinese art, shorn of distracting details like mountains and pine trees, could be translated into pure form; indeed, that 'basic design' underlay the Chinese art. (Source: *Art Now Hong Kong*, Urban Council, 1969.)
韓志勳的作品，絲網，1969，〈今日的香港藝術〉，市政局。幾何圖形與抽象藝術是純西方的元素與風格。但在六十年代末，香港藝術家堅信中國藝術中講求的神韻，若刪去細節如山、松樹等物象，畫面是可以變成純幾何圖形，這亦是中國藝術的基本設計(資料來源：〈今日的香港藝術〉，市政局，1969)。

(below) 'Fei jai' (Teddy boys) and revolutionaries. Competing images of modernity after the riots of 1966 and 1967. (Soruce: Hong Kong and Kowloon Workers Study and Use Mao Zedong Thought. Hong Kong United Workers' Press, 10 January 1968.)
(下圖)「飛仔」及革命份子，一九六六年及六七年暴動後的摩登形象的競爭(資料來源：〈港九各業工人活學活用毛澤東思想展覽畫冊〉，港九工會聯合全編印，1968.1.10)。

Colonial authorities supported this sort of *esprit de corps*, but until the social reforms of the Maclehose era, offered little more than bread and circuses. Even after the riots of 1967, the most elevated vision of society was that offered by the Federation of Hong Kong Industries, the soulless 'Hong Kong Inc.,' in which society was pictured as a company run by managers, a business in which all would benefit from cooperation and efficiency.

(一)香工友是美國迪斯嚴造船工人，以前他受了西方腐化墮落生活方式的影響，習染着很多不良嗜好。終日爛賭、爛飲、爛食，也亂搞男女關係。是個十足典型的「飛仔」。

「飛仔」的轉變



(十六)經過不斷學習，不斷鬥爭，他就更加堅決勇敢，在另一次遊行中，突然出現了警事。他堅決執行毛主席的指示，和戰友們一起揮動拳頭，高呼口號，迫使警車溜走，示威遊行勝利完成。他說，這是毛澤東思想的勝利。

It is remarkable that such an illiberal, exploitative, corrupt, *laissez-faire* society held together at all. So it was that the gathering identity of Hong Kong people during the last years of the sixties was not the civic loyalty of the citizen, nor an identity of community interest, which in any case was denied by the philosophy of *laissez-faire*. It was rather an identity of life-style, a shared recognition of similar self-images, real or desired, of existential choices, from food to education, that had to be made now that Hong Kong people could no longer be guided either by Chinese tradition, or (since the demise of Shanghai) Chinese modernity. Chinese modernity was now in the grip of the Cultural Revolution. Despite a well-orchestrated campaign, ranging from locally produced cartoon books, a "patriotic" fashion show, and even ehlisting local film stars like Shek Wai, the imagery of modernity inevitably conflicted with preciseally the 'mor dun' styles inculcated by nascent consumerism. Although



Mediated identities. Movie stars made in Hong Kong (above) by Shaw Brothers, and (below) in a game for fans to spot identities behind the company's (SB) mask. (Source: Southern Screen)

媒介傳播的身份：(上圖)邵氏製片公司製造出來的香港電影明星。(下圖) 邵氏公司商標後的明星是誰競猜遊戲 (資料來源：〈南國電影〉)。

it may have appealed to many workers and stud
in the end the attractions of the 'shop window'
stronger. Tradition, as well as modernity, would
have to be *re*-made in Hong Kong, if not by sch
then by Shaw Brothers. In the process, Hong Kon
to become less a Chinese city with a remarkable hi
and more a remarkably a-historical 'Chinatown.'

Before the early seventies, however, the administra
itself carefully avoided issues of cultural or poli
identity in its appeals to 'community.' It was repea
emphasized that the population had no st
attachments to the territory, or to each other. 'Lo
was held to be the core of citizenship, but Hong K
people were considered loyal only to their partic
dialect group, place of origin, occupation, un
business, charitable organization, and above al
their family. If there were no sense of 'identit
community interest,' it was argued, there could b
identity comparable to Western national iden
Accordingly, the local population was not consid
ready for the exercise of democratic self-determina
that citizenship would confer.[27]

However, a 'Hong Kong people,' having been bro
into existence, even if rhetorically, could not b
lightly dissolved. Already in the fifties, the refu
had felt themselves to be 'in the same boa
uncertain destiny, set adrift from China, a fee
reinforced by the issue of ID Cards from 1949
erection of the border in 1950, and the beginnin
the housing programme in 1954. Survival in this
brutal society restricted expressions of identity to
instrumental and pragmatic, such as the Chi
Manufacturers' Union campaign to persuade
people to buy local products as traditional A
markets turned protectionist.[28]Before the sixties, H
Kong exhibited an ambivalent identity, like m
displaced *huàqiáo* communities and overseas Chin

conservative in cultural values but modernized in economic activity and life-style. A decade later it was evident that local life-style was displacing traditional cultural attachments as the basis of identity, to the point where, in the mid-eighties the great majority of the population identified themselves as 'Hong Kong people,' not 'Chinese people.'[29] In this respect, the sixties represents the coming of age of the 'Hong Kong people.'

(Above) Competing images of identity through fashion, June 1989. Sixties retro look, and (below) one of Jimmy Lai's 'Tiananmen' T-shirts.
(上圖)從時裝看身份形象的競爭，一九八九年六月。六十年代復古時裝。(下圖) 黎智英的「天安門」T 恤設計之一。

Hong Kong Nineties

Today, a quarter of a century after the Hong Kong people's coming of age, and after long-delayed democratic reforms are underway, do we now recognize ourselves as a 'people' -or do we remain a fragmented 'population' of émigres and immigrants, refugees and expatriates, mere 'residents' of a city? Has Hong Kong evolved an independent 'cultural identity,' -or has prosperity merely overlaid Chinese society with the gloss of fashionable, western 'lifestyles'?

These questions might seem academic. If, as we are constantly told, Hong Kong's history, economy and society are all 'unique,' then so too are its people. Hong Kong people use the same language, laugh at the same jokes, and share much the same libertarian, materialistic values and aspirations; by contrast, the culture of the Mainland or even Taiwan appear to us as radically different. Above all, Hong Kong is a remarkably homogeneous society -ethnically, linguistically and culturally- far more so than the city-state of Singapore.

But the questions are not academic. Cultural identity is not a matter of fact, nor determined by professors, but is a product of the popular imagination -and imagination is circumscribed by ideology.[30] Unlike Singapore, Hong Kong has never claimed national independence, and unlike Taiwan has never claimed political independence, and so we find invisible barriers to imagining our society as culturally independent.

These ideological limitations have determined the curious privilege paid to productions from other places. From the foundation of City Hall, the building officially claimed to be synonymous with the development of local culture, Hong Kong has been treated as unique -but only for its geopolitical position:

> Hong Kong is uniquely placed to bring together the cultures of East and West. In the City Hall we hope to see performances of music and drama, and exhibitions

Hong Kong Cultural Centre
香港文化中心

> of arts connected with literature and painting both Chinese and Western, for the benefit of all who live in Hong Kong of whatever race.[31]

Accordingly, Hong Kong's autochthonous culture and identity have remained largely unarticulated and unrecorded. And if there is no culture there cannot be said to be a people.

Despite assurances of a 'Hong Kong ruled by Hong Kong people,'[32] in formal documents the People's Republic assumes that there is no such thing as a 'people' of Hong Kong, and indeed the *Joint Declaration* describes the population in neutral, neutralizing terms such as 'inhabitants' or 'residents,' while local culture is rendered merely as 'lifestyle.'[33] These words now determine Hong Kong's future:

> Hong Kong's previous capitalist system and life-style shall remain unchanged for 50 years.
>
> *Joint Declaration*

What is the Hong Kong 'life-style'? A taste for fashion, gossip magazines and Karaoke? A paradise for consumers and polluters? Or does life-style suggest something deeper, perhaps the subjective texture of identity? Is life-style like citizenship, the rights of association and and forms of representation that underlie civil society, and make it possible for citizens to shape policies of common concern? Or is life-style like fashion, changing from moment to moment? Since no society could 'remain unchanged for fifty years,' how will social change be legitimized? At the heart of the agreements on Hong Kong's future lies a slippery neologism which may be interpreted to mean almost anything.

Beijing and London do not suppose life-style
contingent on national identity. Both nations as
continuity of the Hong Kong lifestyle as British
port holders become Chinese nationals on 1
1997. Indeed, long before London and Beijing
negotiations, Britain had already begun to char
immigration laws (1962, 1968, 1981) to exclude, a
others, British passport holders who had formerl
encouraged to renounced their Chinese natio
Despite the 'Shop window of Democracy' trum
by the Hong Kong Festival, the 'community-bu
programmes of the Maclehose administration, a
'Rose Garden' vision promulgated after the Tiana
the administration has long avoided a definition
cal' identity, and with it, questions of status,
cratic representation, and the Hong Kong people
in deciding their future through self-determina

In this context, the 1989 opening of the Hong
Cultural Centre may be interpreted as marking a c
of direction in the civic discourse of local cultur
official mould of local culture, symbolized by Cit
thirty years earlier, seemed to have run its cours
was easily wrested from an administration in t
by representatives of a newly politicized local cu

Opened on 4th November 1989, the Cultural C
was ten years in the making.[34] Governor Maclehos
the foundation stone in 1979, but the opening
was more significant, for it came just after Gov
Wilson's policy address a month earlier, w
interpreted as a palliative to the shock o
Tiananmen Massacre. Having failed to secure B
passport rights for the population, the Governo
at least able to commit his administration to
capital works in the form of a new airport, tog
with a massive increases in tertiary education
extensive redevelopment and beautification of t
areas (the 'Rose Garden'), including expanded cu
provision, as a package to bolster shattered confi

As a symbol of cultural regeneration howeve
Cultural Centre did not readily inspire confide
indeed, the general reaction was one of dismay, b
because its outdated design conveyed no part
meaning, but most of all for its windowless, fa
character. Whereas City Hall had radiated an ope
that displaced the past (even the closed Concer
were provided with balconies to capitalize o
harbour view), the closed, blank Cultural C
seemed to obliterate the culture it claim
represent -figuratively turning its back on
Kong.

Those who saw the Cultural Centre in this light
not surprised when some three years later the C
and Recreation Branch of Government issu

Consultation Paper, *Arts Policy*, a document universally condemned for its absence of policy.[35] But it hardly mattered, for since the phenomenal public reaction to Tiananmen in Hong Kong, artists and critics began to grasp the political dimensions of expressions of local culture. Before 1989, a consensus was building that: 'Colonialism has taken away Hong Kong people's sense of being Chinese. They need to build up their identity as Chinese."[36] Dancers and dramatists, painters and designers had increasingly articulated their rediscovery of Chinese heritage, their willingness to learn from the source and to contribute their understanding of modern techniques to the modernization of the nation. Catching a trend internationalized by *The Last Emperor*, fashion designers were particularly enthusiastic:

> I am beginning to feel a sense of belonging. I don't really have any roots, but now that we see more of the mainland Chinese I feel a need to identify...
>
> When China takes over, we will have an identity to match with our skills. China needs designers to reach out to the world, and they will find them here.[37]

After '6/4', expressions of cultural identity quickly retreated, confused, to the ambiguities of the late sixties and early severties, as in the new logo of Cathay Pacific Airways -neither Western (too colonial) nor Chinese (too political), but rather a diffuse, modernistic 'orientalism.'[38] For a sizeable, and vocal minority however, the expresseion of local identity came to be seen as the foundation for political integrity, underwriting the high degree of autonomy and democracy promised in the *Joint Declaration* :

> Localism, in this light, means the uniqueness of Hong Kong must be ...culturally established (by) exploring creatively the specific ways in which the mixed but distinctive cultural identity of Hong Kong has evolved... For culture is the longest front for local democratic struggle that could, if won, nurture a common sense of belonging.[39]

Within a year of the *Arts Policy* report, many of its most vocal critics had been absorbed into a new Arts Development Council.

It was Governor Patten's policy address of October 1992, however, that drew the issue of life-style, and its implications for culture, stumbling into the political limelight, and opened the way for wider political support of artistic expression. For it was to strengthen the "way of life" of our "community" (both terms suggesting rather more than the 'life-style' of 'inhabitants') that the franchise was significantly expanded. In the bitter reaction from China that followed these moves, the old sixties idea of a 'three-legged stool' (in which the continuity of Hong Kong's 'way of life' was held to depend upon the consent of Britain, China *and the Hong Kong people*)[40] was singled out for criticism. Hong Kong people are now presented with a stark choice of supporting a politicized vision of a 'way of life' (with its suggestion of a cultural divide from the Motherland), or accepting China's de-politicized, ambiguous and seemingly superficial formulation of 'life-style.'

In times of political uncertainty, it is perhaps tempting to avoid disconcerting questions of identity and fall back on the view that the population of Hong Kong is composed of rootless, a-political opportunists: short-term residents with expensive tastes but no real culture. In this pragmatic, individualistic view, concern about identity might amount to no more than acquisition of a foreign passport.

Hong Kong in the nineties is suspended between a remote, evasive London and a suspicious, vengeful Beijing. As we are once again forced to choose between conflicting self-images, it may be worth briefly rehearsing the genealogy of competing representations of Hong Kong culture.

Hong Kong culture has been interpreted by scholars of many disciplines: anthropologists (from the 50's), sociologists (from the 60's), political analysts (from the 70's), and cultural critics (from the 80's). Most of these studies have expressed, or adopted, the standpoint of a detached observer, and until recently, most have been at pains to present Hong Kong as a stratified, fragmented society. Scholarly representations of Hong Kong, perhaps reacting against bogus images of 'community,' have tended to follow the traditional description of the Chinese people as 'grains of sand,' lacking the social cohesion that was believed crucial to Japanese or European national development.

Western anthropologists, or district officials with an anthropological eye, were among the first to construct representations of Hong Kong culture that have in turn influenced Hong Kong's self-image, and are still widely influential.[41] From the 1950's, their studies of Hong Kong culture were often a substitute for a study of China, then closed to foreigners. For the most part avoiding urban areas, 'Chinese-ness' was instead sought out in New Territories' villages, which were perceived to be remote from the contamination of capitalism and communism. Not surprisingly, such studies foregrounded conservative attitudes and


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political indifference as the basis of Hong Kong civic culture.[42]

By contrast, Chinese reflections on Hong Kong tended to present the urban society as a degenerate, treaty port culture. Northern emigrés, exiled by war and revolution, were predisposed to see Cantonese culture as backward, conservative and inferior, and despised the 'derivative culture' of those who had ingratiated themselves with colonialism. Many saw nothing but squalor, obscenity and greed in the city. This picture of Hong Kong as a backward Chinese culture, perverted by westernization, and debased by commercialism, remains a potent image, from the pre-war period to the modern period.[43]

Ironically, this disdainful image not only matched the purist instincts of Chinese scholars, but reinforced colonial attitudes, and even found an echo in American propaganda of the period, which sought to engender a more elevated patriotism among the refugees in order to prepare for the overthrow of Communism. During the sixties, it also suited the Colonial administration's practice of distancing itself from its Chinese subjects, with the more cosmopolitan Shanghainese minority as a buffer. Moreover, the notion of a transitory population of economic migrants avoided further entanglements with the issue of nationality, and helped the government resist calls for democratic representation: how could such a hotchpotch of individuals ever constitute a political 'majority'?

By the late 1960's Hong Kong's economic and social development had focused attention on its urban society. This were still often presented as a study in cultural pathology, of the breaking down of 'traditional' patterns of Chinese culture, in self-seeking, materialistic individualism. It appears to have been generally accepted that Hong Kong would produce neither a cohesive society, nor an indigenous culture. Sociologists reinterpreted the old 'treaty port culture' as a society bound together by no more than 'utilitarianistic familism'. Because society under colonial rule was perceived as atomistic and politically unorganized, it seemed to follow that cultural identity was similarly fragmented:

> An individual places his familial interests above the interests of society ...Materialistic interests take priority over all other interests (since) in the industrial, urban and colonial society of Hong Kong individuals are more or less alienated from the social or political order, and are uncertain about the future. In urban Hong Kong today virtually none of the organizational and ecological features of the traditional family exist.[44]

Academic representations of this fragmented society were not out of place in the wider political context. During the 1970's the Maclehose administration had openly pursued a policy of 'community-building,' through social reforms, festivals and popular campaigns to 'Fight Crime" and 'Clean Hong Kong,' with slogans such as 'Hong Kong for Hong Kong people,' 'Be loyal to Hong Kong,' and 'We are a family living under one roof' -all slogans detested by intellectuals in the Student Movement.[45] Yet by the 1980's, surveys showed a dramatic (to sociologists astonishing) rise in the population's identification as 'Hong Kong people' in preference to 'Chinese' and, towards the end of the decade, academic and official opinion polls found the great majority in favour of moves towards full democracy. After violent objections from China to any political changes which might weaken its future administration of the territory, the Hong Kong Government commissioned a particularly complex poll in order to demonstrate that the local population was as 'divided' as ever, still unprepared for full democracy.[46]

For a time, it seemed as if the academics and the administrators had exchanged roles, with the bureaucracy suddenly disclaiming the democratic aspirations of 'citizens' it had brought into being, while academics had begun to respond to confident assertions of indigenous culture. Many academics, however, including those with a particular interest in the Hong Kong identity, were later to be appointed by Beijing to its various advisory committees, constituted in advance of the resumption of sovereignty. Given the vehemence of its objections to democratic development,[47] China cannot be expected to approve representations of the Hong Kong people that show a cohesive cultural identity, particularly an identity constituted against the Mainland. In this, China has adopted British tactics of the 1960's, supporting a heavily circumscribed 'community-building', even a 'meeting of East and West,' but avoiding autochthonous culture, and expressions of an independent cultural identity.

China has also demonstrated a keen appreciation for models of patrician leadership exercised in Hong Kong during the sixties. The appointment of senior Hong Kong figures of that generation such as S.Y. Chung, T.K. Ann as high-profile advisors recalls an earlier era when the same figures led the Federation of Hong Kong Industries and propounded its de-politicized rhetoric of progress.

Despite the promises of the Joint Declaration, its Annexes, and the Basic Law to maintain Hong Kong's 'life-style', any official moves to strengthen local culture, even the acknowledgment of its distinctness from the Mainland, may now be interpreted by China as 'splittist': a drift towards 'local nationalism', 'rebellious provincialism,' 'regionalism' or 'separatism' -all ultimately seditious. In Hong Kong, even political leaders who claim, with justification, to represent the voice of the majority, have been viewed as subversive, and subversion will be curbed under the Basic Law.

Penalties for demands for self-determination through expressions of cultural identity in the Special Autonomous Region of Tibet do not need to be elaborated. China is acutely aware of the political threat posed by cultural identity, the more so following the break up of the Soviet Union and the challenge of its own ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, not only in Tibet, but in Mongolia, Xinjiang (which one group recently declared to be 'East Turkestan'), and even Yunnan, and most problematic of all (for a wholly Chinese issue) the independence movement in Taiwan. In this 'rebellious province,' 45 years of rapid, separate development, has led many Taiwanese to consider themselves culturally independent, and on these grounds -and not on grounds of a capitalist economy- to demand political independence.[54]

For quite different reasons Britain has also avoided any policy emphasizing the separateness of local culture. This has less to do with acceding to China's wishes than with justifying its decision to dispose of 3.25 million British passport holders. British politicians will not countenance an influx of people, whatever their passport says, who are culturally different.

So Hong Kong culture will remain, officially at least, tightly circumscribed by politics. If local cultural identity and political integrity -the one supports the other- is to be realized, it will no longer find official support. However, in this Hong Kong is not alone. We share the experience of more than three quarters of the people living in the world today whose lives were once shaped by colonialism, and who must now come to terms with new realities and new identities.

The problem of self-image in a territory that will shortly cease to exist in its present form, of British 'subjects' without nationality, the 'compatriots' of a China from which most have chosen to leave, seems to bring us back to earlier images of a dislocated, alienated society, a population of "residents and other persons" without an unique identity to protect, merely a capitalistic "way of life" to maintain. Such an image is a convenient expedient used to justify the political decision of Britain and China not to allow the Hong Kong people to speak for themselves.

For Britain and China the people of Hong Kong are Chinese by race, and with the end of the 'unequal treaties' are now able to rejoin the Chinese nation. The inhabitants of this city are no more a separate people, and have no more right to self-determination, than the citizens of Shanghai or Birmingham. Just as London refused the immigration of Hong Kong people *because* Hong Kong Chinese possess an alien cultural identity, so Beijing concurs that Hong Kong's inhabitants never ceased to be other than Chinese. Apart from International Law (which has no power) and the United Nations (which has no teeth) and the opinions of the Hong Kong people (who have no voice), all sides are in accord.

The parallel repeatedly drawn here between culture and politics might irritate those who perceive them to be polar opposites -the legacy of colonialism and warnings from the Mainland here coincide. But the argument is not to claim that culture is determined by politics, rather to suggest how *identity* is a linchpin for both culture and politics in Hong Kong.

In 1992 the Swiss-based International Commission of Jurists published their *Report of a Mission to Hong Kong*, in which Hong Kong's transfer of sovereignty from the United Kingdom to the Peoples' Republic of China was emphatically judged to have been illegal (and strongly implied to have been knowingly illegal) because the people of Hong Kong were not given the right of self-determination. Of course the Report came far too late to have any impact, but neither have its decisions been challenged.[48]

Self-determination does not equate to independence, but rather a peoples' democratic right to choose, in this case, to approve or reject decisions concerning Hong Kong's future.[49] The two questions facing the jurists were first, what constitutes a 'people', and second, whether the

inhabitants of Hong Kong constituted a 'people'? According to United Nations deliberations on colonial issues the answer to the first question is:

(a) a social entity possessing a clear identity and its own characteristics;

(b) a relationship with a territory..[50]

Hong Kong is plainly a social entity possessing its own *characteristics*, chief among these being an ethnic, cultural and linguistic homogeneity (rivaling the homogeneity claimed by Japan), and sharp cultural differences both with the Mainland and with Taiwan. Clearly, too, the Hong Kong people have a strong relationship with the territory of Hong Kong, since in the last decades the majority were born here. Besides, as in Belgium, a country as old as Hong Kong, sharing a common culture is not necessarily inconsistent with a separate identity.

Does Hong Kong possess a clear *identity*? From the standpoint of International Law, it is clear that the Hong Kong people are a 'people.' But an identity that can be possessed can also be taken away, just as the Hong Kong people have been 'divided', constituted as a 'community', only to be dissolved, reconstituted and dissolved again with the ebb and flow of politics. In the end cultural identity, like democracy, cannot be given by lawyers, politicians, or professors -it must be made.

The colonial articulation of the cultural and the civic expressed in City Hall during the sixties must now be '*re*-made in Hong Kong' in the nineties, but it does not need to be articulated in a single, grand rhetoric.[51] 'Life-style' here presents itself as a site of resistance for local identity. It is perhaps all the better for being unarticulated, yet at the heart of the *Joint Declaration*, for life-style can be expressed, but it cannot easily be censored.



FOOTNOTES

[1] *Preface to* Hong Kong City Hall 1962-1982, Urban Council, Hong Kong, 1982, *and* Endacott,G.B., A History of Hong Kong, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1973, *p.323, referring to the later 1950's.*

[2] *According to the building's architect, Ronald Phillips, "in January 1957 my early recollection was that the public's enthusiasm for the then proposed* City Hall *was very mild and, in part, hostile." in "The City Hall from the Architect's Eyes", Hong Kong City Hall 1962-1992, Urban Council. Popular anti-British sentiment is of course not well-publicized; unofficially the administration was more candid. For example, during Vice-President Nixon's visit to Hong Kong in 1953, he asked the government "why it was not possible to let the people vote, and was told that they would vote against the British, ten to one. Some of the people hate the British."* (US National Archives NSC 166/1 Doc.149).

[3] *Endacott,op.cit., p.323.*

[4] *An initial colonial, colonnaded design of 1953 was rejected (*Hong Kong City Hall 1962-1982 *, p.17) as an insensitive monument for a population of several millions of refugees -53,000 of whom had just been rendered homeless by the Shek Kip Mei fire of the same year. The prominent position contrasted with that of the first City Hall, which had been demolished in 1935 to provide the site for the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank headquarters -according to some, a fitting epitaph to Hong Kong's earlier pretensions to culture. In this way, City Hall underlined the new importance placed on culture rather than commerce as the legitimization for an administration otherwise unrepresentative of the governed.*

[5] *Hong Kong Government, Report of the Advisory Committee on the Proposed Federation of Industries, 1958. See also Turner, M., The Making of Hong Kong, Federation of Hong Kong Industries 30th Anniversary, 1990.*

[6] *Earlier expressions of 'belonging' were manifest as sentimental colonialism, as in Bishop Ronald Hall's address, "Become Philoptolists," given to a middle school in 1965: to become "a people who love their city, the great international city-state of Hong Kong." Quoted in* Wilson,D., Hong Kong, London, 1990, *p.43.*

[7] *"Show-window of democracy" -a particularly ambivalent phrase suggesting the artifice of 'window-dressing', that democracy is a tradable 'commodity', and that the Hong Kong people are 'dummies' in the window- is taken from Sir Cho-yiu Kwan's message for the Festival, and the "community...as one" from A.de O.Sales's message, reproduced in the commemorative Festival of Hong Kong Photo Contest, A.Keller & Co., Hong Kong, 1970. The Festival of Hong Kong followed the 1967 'Hong Kong Week,' organized by the Hong Kong Federation of Industries.*

[8] E.G., Pryor, Housing in Hong Kong, Oxford, 1973, pp.30-39. *Regulations for plot ratio and site coverage were relaxed in the later 1950's, and not controlled until 1966, when the bank credit crisis in any case cut short the unprecedented building boom. The re-development of Hong Kong transformed the predominantly four and five-story urban environment into the characteristically modern high-rise profile. 1961 and 1971 Census results reveal that households occupying public sector flats rose from 76,000 to 328,000, that is, from just over 10% to almost 50% of all households.*

[9] *A confrontation with laissez-faire colonial government in 1966 and 1967 wase almost inevitable for purely domestic reasons. For although Hong Kong's industrialization was built on unlimited supplies of cheap refugee labour, by the mid-sixties the influx of immigrants, legal or illegal, had been drastically reduced. This 'inelasticity of labour' and the resulting competition for workers would have led to rising wages, eating into profits, and holding back exansion unless, as happened, employers made strenuous efforts not to 'poach' workers and collectively to hold down wages and conditions of work. That this was recognized at the time, by unions, employers and government, is revealed by the number of reform proposals forced on the Hong Kong administration after 1964 by a Labour Government in the U.K. -reforms vigorously resisted by the Federation of Hong Kong Industries. When the flashpoint came, reform measures were ready to be implemented. In other words, conditions in the domestic economy were just as important as the Cultural Revolution in provoking conflict.*

[10] *The first Festival of Fashions of November 1967 was originally intended to promote local garment exports, but a 'Hong Kong Week' was added to the show to promote the whole range of local design. The riots, bombs and murders of summer 67 overtook the planning, and the event was worked up into a community event of exhibitions, competitions, pop concerts, sports events, plays and spectacles, culminating in a floats parade. Minutes of the 121st General Committee Meeting (21/3/67) of the Federation of Hong Kong Industries, paper GC-876 'Hong Kong Festival of Fashions' and internal Federation Report on Hong Kong Week, November, 1967, p.18 [source: Federation archives]. See also Garrett,V.M., Chinese Clothing, Oxford, 1994, p.107.*

[11] Leung Kwan-kwok, "Student Politics in Hong Kong: Democracy and Transition," in: McMillen, D.H. & M.E. DeGolyer (eds.) One Culture, Many Systems, Hong Kong, 1993, pp.159-61. Student movements of the late 60's were more romantically than politically nationalistic, and focused as much on domestic reforms -the Language Movement of 1970 addressed colonial rule. According to local media analyst Ng Ho (Ng Chun Bong), a search for a local cultural identity was the motivating force behind the early 70's television directors, notably in the series Beneath the Lion Rock.

[12] Choi Po-king, "From Dependence to Self-Sufficiency: Rise of the Indigenous Culture of Hong Kong, 1945-1989," Asian Culture, 4/90, Hong Kong: "The late seventies saw the emergence of an indigneous culture in the form of mass entertainment, including TV productions, popular songs and films. These are highly significant, because, not only is their audience drawn from across the social spectrum, but that they reflect life-patterns and values that are peculiar to Hong Kong community itself."

[13] "Plain Talk," E.Pereira's column in Hong Kong Standard, 28/2/1965.

[14] Most recently, by the Mainland film director Chen Kaige (speaking to the BBC at the Cannes Festival 25/5/93),who uses this as an explanation for the absence of a Chinese sense of people as a 'rights-bearing' individuals, the foundation of (Western) human rights and democracy. The dictionary provides shen fen suggesting 'status,' while rentong, which coveys the recognition of similarities, remains a scholarly term, usually compounded with culture:wenhua rentong.

[15] The issue is discussed by Stuart Hall in "A Question of Identity", in Hall,S. (ed.,) Modernity and its Futures, Open University, 1993. Hall proposes a three stage development of identity, from the 'Enlightenment Subject', a stable self endowed with reason, to the "Sociological Subject" the self as a social construct, and finally the "Postmodern Subject', in which the 'narrative' of self is dissolved in competing discourses. For the Structuralists, identity was produced by language, rather than language 'reflecting' an essential individual or communal identity.

[16] Anderson, B., Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, London, Verso, 1983, p.15.

[17] From the 1960's one of Hong Kong's fastest growing domestic industries. See: Indian Chamber of Commerce, Industrial Hong Kong: Clocks and Watches, Hong Kong, 1971.

[18] The typology of social time is taken from Gurvich,G., The Spectrum of Social Time, Dordrecht, 1964, quoted in Harvey, D., The Condition of Postmodernity, Oxford, 1989, pp.223-225.

[19] After Nazi (and Imperial Japanese) uses of 'race' during the Second World War, scholars avoided the concept, preferring 'ethnicity' or 'culture.' The concept of 'multiple identities' among Chinese derives from studies of huaqiao communities in Asia, notably Y.C.Lim and L.Gosling (eds.), The Chinese in Southeast Asia, (Vol.2, Identity, Culture and Politics), Singapore, Maruzen, 1983, and J.Cushman & Wang Gungwu, (eds.) Changing Identities of the Southeast Asian Chinese Since World War II, Hong Kong University, 1988, particularly Wang Gungwu's introductory "The Study of Chinese Identities in Southeast Asia," in which 'identity' is broken down into 7 categories: Historical, Nationalist, Communal, Local, Cultural, Ethnic, and Class identities. The model has been adapted to the Taiwan situation in Yang Kuo-shu (ed.), Chinese People's Psychology, Taipei, 1988.

[20] Umberto Eco, Travels in Hyper-Reality, English ed.trans. William Weaver, Picador 1987, pp.12-19. Originally published 1976. [The Palace of Living Arts closed in 1982.]

[21] Information attached to Information Services photographs (HK PRO HKRS 365 1/291). The 'Kwan Yin' candle apparently "brought the company world wide recognition".

[22] For waxworks and wax museum see feature articles and photographs from Information Services, Hong Kong Public Record Office, HKRS 365 5686/1-4; N 1059 1-17. HK Chemical Industries Ltd. formed a separate company, Wafista [for Wax Figure Statures Ltd], which was followed in 1969 by a waxwork company run by Vivien Sun, which continued to supply Long Beach.

[23] The exhibition was curated by the critic and historian Nigel Cameron. The story of 'The Chinese Renaissance' was re-told by Nigel Cameron in a 1988 exhibition of the same title in Exchange Square (Catalogue Hongkong Land).

[24] A myth of origins may be said to exist in the popular recourse to the "fishing village to metropolis" story. In this version of history, reinforced by official publications, Hong Kong had no settled population, no industry, and no identity before the influx of millions of refugee peasants in 1949, who were transformed into industrious workers by Shanghainese with money and organizational skills, while the British merely provided stable government. This story has been comprehensively rejected by scholars (for example, that Hong Kong's 1.8 million pre-war population had already developed extensive industries, the refugees were comparatively well-educated, and the government was remarkably interventionist behind the mask of laissez-faire)), so its popular survival suggests mythic qualities. For a formulation of the view that lack of linguistic or constitutional instruments for identity is the reason for Hong Kong's lack of democracy see W.MacNeil, "Righting and Difference," in Wacks,R.(ed.) Human Rights in Hong Kong, Oxford, 1992, p.96f: "lack of emblematic or figural representations may, in fact, be not an effect of, but a contributing factor to the literal lack of representative institutions in Hong Kong"

[25] Homi K.Bhabha, "DissemiNation," in Bhabha,H., (ed.), Nation and Narration, London, 1990, pp.291-322.

[26] In Chinese, the various descriptions of Hong Kong people include renkou (population), jumín (residents), shìmín (citizens) and renmín (people in the sense of 'public') -but never as mín, (race) which would claim Hong Kong people as a 'people,' an ethno-cultural sub-group.

[27] Report of the Working Party on Local Administration, 1966, p.84: "Hong Kong society is accustomed to organize itself into groups based not on identity of community interest in a given area but upon traditionally accepted charitable interests, language, place of origin, occupation, business, profession, etc....."

[28] "Hong Kong Residents should Use Hong Kong Products," award-winning essay by Joseph Veiga, reproduced in the Chinese Manufacturers' Union, Pictorial Record of the 16th Exhibition of Chinese Products, Hong Kong, 1958, p.95f: "If we do not 'Buy Hong Kong' as we should, the result will be less factories, less production, less employment, less prosperity for Hong Kong and therefore for you and me and all other residents."

[29] Lau Siu-kai & Kuan Hsin-chi, The Ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese, Chinese University, 1988, p178. In the authors' 1985 survey 60% identified themselves as distinct from 'Chinese', and 80% felt a strong or very strong sense of belonging to Hong Kong. The authors confessed to astonishment at this striking display of identity.

[30] Anderson, op.cit, argues that identity is always imagined (for example, through the illusion of a shared, simultaneous time as we all read the evening news), since we will never meet more than a fraction of the individuals whom we believe we share a common bond.

[31] Speech by Sir Robert Black at City Hall Foundation Ceremony, February 1960, from City Hall 1962-82, op.cit., 1982. Local identity was not easily imagined squeezed between contending civilizations, and so the slogan 'East meets West,' for so long the official cultural policy of the Government and Urban Council, has tended to obliterate autochthonous culture.

[32] By Liao Chengzhi, Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, to a group of visiting Hong Kong factory owners, 20/11/82 (Cotterell, R., The End of Hong Kong, London, 1993, p.198) Deng Xiao-ping was more circumspect in stating that: "Hong Kong will be administered by people in Hong Kong," [3/10/84] quoted in Deng Xiao-ping on the Question of Hong Kong, New Horizon, Hong Kong, 1993,p.19.

[33] 1984 Joint Declaration , Article 3 [4], [5]; and Annexe I [1], [xiv].

[34] The design was produced by Government Architects, notably Mr Jozé Lau. Comments on the design are taken from contemporary newspaper accounts.

[35] Arts Policy Review Report, Recreation and Culture Branch, March 1993. For a collection of criticism see Cultural Policy Study Group, In Search of Cultural Policy, Zuni Icosahedron, Hong Kong, 1994.

[36] Li You, "At the Luohu Bridge," People's Literature, 6, 1986, reprinted in Ta Kung Pao, 2/10/86.

[37] Fashion designers Ragence Lam and (below) Eddie Lau, as recorded in "A Gathering Identity," by Wilson, D., Hong Kong Hong Kong, London, 1990, p.46;53.

[38] See criticism of the CPA logo in Hong Kong Economic Journal, 21/9/93.

[39] In Search of Cultural Policy, op.cit., p.31.

[40] The 'three-legged stool' was summed up by Dennis Bray in United College Bulletin, 1971, pp.18-25: "Hong Kong's stability rests on a tripod of consents, each of which is essential for the continuation of anything like the present way of life. These three consents are the consent of Hong Kong people, the consent of China and the consent of Britain."

[41] The colonial view is crystallized in the concluding pages of Austin Coates, Myself a Mandarin, Muller, 1968, looking back over the 50's and 60's: When a Westerner comes to China, no matter how high his rank or how great his influence, all he can achieve -all that he will ever achieve- is to add a grain of salt to sea-water, since China, like the sea, is adamantine, and of unchanging substance." In the context of revolution on the Mainland, and modernization in urban Hong Kong and Taiwan, it is conclusion that says more about sentimental colonialism than about Hong Kong society. The survival of this view may be judged from Simon Winchester's account of the localization of the territory ("Personal Opinion," BBC TV 6/94) in which Governor Patten was taxed for attempting to introduce an alien concept of democracy to 'adamantine' Chinese culture.

[42] For example, a translation from Chinese village culture to big city politics is maintained in Ambrose Y.C.King's "The Political Culture of Kwun Tong: A Chinese Community in Hong Kong," originally published in Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, vol.59. 1-2, 1977. In conclusion, he quotes the views of a variety of ethnographic studies in support of the contention that "the people in Kwun Tong still hold strong traditional, paternalistic views about government...(and) the political culture is predominantly a parochial one." More provocatively, these findings are presented as a preliminary "theoretical and empirical base...from which to begin to study the nature of the political system in the Colony."

[43] Consider the following: "There is no place that gives me a worse impression. I might be a bit extreme, but the revolting, unnatural foreignism in some places, and the basest possible slavishness is nonetheless real...This is colonial culture -young people can speak English, but knowledge which is slightly more profound is out of their reach. Appealing to the lower senses, obscene, appearing to be modern but primitive in essence....The low standard of culture of the Hong Kong-ese is both pathetic and laughable..." Adapted from Lu Weiluan, Xianggang de Youyu, (Melancholy in Hong Kong), Huafeng Bookstore, Hong Kong, 1983, pp.157-60; 185; 207. The translation is from Choi Po-King, "The Students' Movement", Sweeting,A.,(ed.) Differences and Identities, University of Hong Kong, 1990, p.92. Compare these statements with the admonishments of social activist Fung Ho-lup against teenagers: "They have no respect any authority, but won't take seides in any social debates. They just don't care for anyone or anything. It is very hard to change attitudes which are a bad mixture of Western individualisem and the Chinese tradition of not bothering about anyone else's problems". Quoted from Hong Kong Hong Kong, op.cit., p.52.

[44] Lau Siu-kai, "Utilitarianistic Familism: the Basis of Political Stability", in King,A.Y.C. & R.Lee (eds.) Social Life and Development in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 1981, pp.201f.

[45] The 'golden age of community-building' is described in Jones, C., Promoting Prosperity: the Hong Kong Way of Social Policy, Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, 1990. For student reaction see Choi Po King, op.cit., p.101.

[46] Green Paper : The Development of Representative Government, (May 1987) and White Paper (February 1988). The survey found almost 3:1 in favour of direct elections, but by not counting signatures as 'individual submissions' it was found that "more were against than in favour of the introduction of direct elections." We might question why the famed 'Westminster model' of democracy, which is designed to accommodate competing interests and conflicting values, was considered inappropriate for Hong Kong?

[47] For example, while calling on Hong Kong people not to give up their "basic right" to participate in democratic elections in 1994, the State Council's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office has not changed its view that the major democracy party is subversive. Accordingly, despite the 'victory' of pro-democracy candidates in elections to the Legislative Council and District Boards, the United Democrats-Meeting Point, and indeed all party three tiers of government, will be dissolved in 1997. South China Morning Post, 13/9/4, p.1.

[48] Countdown to 1997: Report of a Mission to Hong Kong, International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, Switzerland, 1992. See Chapter 5, pp.40-56, for a discussion of 'people.'

[49] UN General Assembly Resolution 1541 recognizes that self-determination may take the form of free association with another state or of integration with another state.

[50] Cristescu,A., The Right to Self-determination: Historical and Current Developments on the Basis of United Nations Instruments, New York, U.N., 1981, para.279.

[51] As Akbar Abbas once said of the performance group Zuni Icosahedron (in discussions following a performance staged at the Hong Kong Polytechnic, January 1992) "the great secret of Zuni's survival is that they do not know what they are doing." Iterating the habits of everyday life, and seizing on objects of multiple, indeterminate symbolism, identity is re-presented as life-style.

化裝遊藝大會

飾演金環二郎 林正中

飾演飛天俠 廖洪勝

飾演公主小姐 王君省

飾演世 王麗莉



飾演跳芭蕾舞 鄭雲霜

飾演小貓俠 李廣治

飾演化花公子 王湘江

飾演黑貓俠 曾馬福

'Miss 1962' Dressing-up games take on a particular significance in the context of the first generation of locally-born children to Chinese refugees, here learning to identify with new, and predominantly western images. *(Source: Soochow Girl comic)*

「一九六二年度香港小姐」的化裝遊藝大會表徵著大陸難民移居香港後所生的第一代思想上的改變，他們認同西方的新形象（資料來源：〈小安琪〉）。